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Abstract:Divination formsanunexpectedlyhighproportionofour total information
on Sparta’s politics, internal and external. It should be studied diachronically, as well as
generically.Toabstractitfromsecularandpoliticalcontextwouldconcealbothcausesand
effects of religious credulity. We read that Sparta’s hereditary dyarchs, the state’s chief
generals,wereappointed,controlledanddeposedaccordingtotheinterpretationofomens
andoracles.Grandomensinparticularwererespected,suchasearthquakeorasuccession
ofmilitary failures.Thiswas inkeepingwith theSpartanbias in favourof events that all
could perceive. Sparta’s kings made famous and apparently extravagant claims to have
privileged ancient links with the gods. But by studying the political vulnerability of the
kingship,we see these religious pretentions as defensive, themost effective shield for an
institutionunderthreat.
Résumé: La divination constitue de façon inattendue une part importante de notre
informationsurlapolitiquedeSparte,tantintérieurequ’extérieure.Onpeutl’étudiertantde
façondiachroniquequedansuneperspectivegénérique.L’abstrairedesoncontexteséculier
etpolitiquereviendraitàocculterà lafois lescauseset leseffetsd’unecrédulitéreligieuse.
NousvoyonsquelesdeuxroishéréditairesdeSparte,lesgénérauxenchefdel’État,étaient
désignés, contrôlés et déposés selon l’interprétation des présages et des oracles. Des
présagesexceptionnelsétaienttoutparticulièrementrespectés,commelestremblementsde
terre ou une succession de revers militaires. Les Spartiates avaient tendance à mettre en
valeurlesévénementsquiétaientvisiblesdetous.LesroisdeSparteontavancédecélèbres
revendications,apparemmentextravagantes,àentretenird’anciens liensprivilégiésavec les




How far, if at all,wereSparta’spolitical decisions influencedbydivination?
Thequestionleadsusintonumerousepisodeswithintheclassicalperiod;italso




VanLiefferinge toaddress the subject in a communicationatBruxelles: sine quibus non. – I am








of Spartan religion by Robert Parker (1989) collects, in its dense treasury of
information,prima facie evidence thatdivinationhad thepower to reverse the
publicundertakingsofSpartanauthorities:onseveraloccasionsSpartanmilitary
expeditions already under way were postponed or abandoned in the face of
negative omens.2Here, itmay seem, is behaviour to comparewith that of the
Athenianled troops in Sicily in413who, onThucydides’ showing, because of
divinationaboutalunareclipsedroppedtheirclamorousinsistenceonaprompt
departurefromSyracuseandinsteadurgedtheirgeneralstoremain.3
Yet, in the twenty years since the appearance of Parker’s work, scholarly
opinionbothonSpartanhistoryandonGreekdivinationhaschangedconsidera
bly.Itmaybeallowablenowforanadmirerofthatworktochallengeoneaspect
of it: namely, Parker’s response to the question how influential divinationwas
among Spartans. That response may seem itself to have a somewhat Delphic
quality.On the one hand, Parker implies disapproval of the way that ‘Almost
every incident of a campaign abandoned or an attack postponed because of
unpromisingomenshasreceivedarationalisingexplanationfromonescholaror
another’ (1989,157f.).Hewrites thatSpartans ‘heededdivinesignsandobeyed
therules’(1989,161);‘thepowerofprophecy’(ibid.)amongSpartansreflecteda
distinctive local attitude. On the other hand, he states that ‘Divination was
doubtlessundercontrolinSparta,asitnormallyiswhereveritispractised’(1989,
160). He notes with ironic disapproval that ‘The charm of divination for the
consultant is that he need never feel that he is acting at random’ (ibid.). He
himself rationalises about the apparent power of omens to affect military
expeditions: ‘If, therefore, a plan or expeditionwas abandoned because of the
lesser obstacle of discouraging sacrifices, the king must either have been
unusually timorous,orhavefeltgenuinedoubtwhethertheproposedactionwas
wise’(1989,15960;emphasisadded).HelikensdivinationamongSpartanstothe
economic forecasting of modern times: ‘Politicians believe profoundly in

1Foranexampleofdelicateevasiveness,Fontenrose,inageneralconclusionaboutDelphic
history: ‘What effect or influencedidDelphi haveupon theGreek states? Ifwe look through
genuineresponses,wemustsay that ithadnodirectandactive influenceuponthem…’(1978,
p.239). One notices the triple qualification (‘genuine’, ‘direct’, ‘active’): how much is being
excluded thereby?ContrastPRITCHETT (1979), p.298, 300: ‘Certainly theoracle atDelphi had
immense influence’. On the (typically unavowed) reasons for modern disbelief in influential
ancientdivination,POWELL(2001),p.4237,FLOWER(2008),p.245,JOHNSTON(2008),p.23.
2 1989, 1567. Other scholars who have taken seriously evidence of Spartan regard for
divinationincludeGROTE,POPP(1957),PRITCHETT(1979)esp.chs.1,3,9,HODKINSON(1983),




economic predictions; politicians are sometimes swayed by economic advice;
politicians find ways of carrying through certain favoured policies whatever
economic advisers may say.’ (160) Here, as ‘profound belief’ gives way to
‘sometimes swayed’, we are left in some doubt as to the practical force of
economic, and thus divinatory, forecasts to affect decisions. Parker writes of
modern historians as ‘embarrassed’ by ancient accounts of military divination
(1989,157).Inseekingtonegotiatethedistancebetweenthosemodernscholars
incredulous of the sources and those who take them seriously or between, as
Parker puts it, ‘scepticism of the sceptics… shown up as dogmatic’ and











ancient references to religion in Sparta’s political and military affairs, but
especiallybytheproportionwhichtheyformofourtotal informationonthose
subjects. And, if we do become aware of the prominence of religion in our
sources, even inThucydideswho–whenwritingofAthens–has rightlybeen
judgedparsimoniousinhisreferencestopoliticaldivination,4wemaybetempted
– in reaction – to reemphasise that prophecy by playing down its apparently
secular context, the context which caused religion to be neglected in the first
place.Butbyabstractingreligioninthisway,wemayreduceourabilitytojudge
its role, its comparative importance, in the discourse of the polis. Parker has
successfully studied Spartan religion in anthropological style: that is, organising











profoundly, culturally as demographically, over the four centuries (6th3rd BC)





preeminent position (asParkerwell shows) in the conduct of religion8 and in















tells little of the circumstances in which were created the various Lakonian
buildings and statues to which he attests. Then there is our information on




leader (presented as dissident or, more rarely, hero), whose death provides a







8ThekingsaspriestsofZeus:Hdt.,VI,56; ashavinggeneral chargeof religion:Ar.,Pol.,
1285a.Cf.PARKER(1989),p.154f.
9Hdt.,VI,57.
10 MILLENDER (2002), p.2: ‘Most of the disparate information on Sparta included in the





nes I and regent Pausanias. The narrative leading to the good death of king
Leonidas,atThermopylai,containsmuchoftheinformationwehaveaboutthe
Persian invasion. The narrative of the downfall, persecution and death of the
AthenianThemistoklesisconnectedbyThucydideswiththestoryofPausanias’
declineandfall:againstbothmeniscasttheaccusationofcollusionwithPersia.
Themistokles, as Thucydides’ account makes clear, had moved from being
intimately admired by the Spartans to being a principal enemy of their state.
Although neither kingPleistoanax (first exiled then restored), nor kingAgis II
(threatenedwith anenormous fine andwith thedemolitionofhishouse, clear
signsofaprojectedexile11)cametoabadend,defamatorysuspicionsaboutboth







divination. The tendency of Spartan history, as we and our literary sources
construct it, tobeshapedbynarrativeofproblematicSpartan leaders isnoless
clearaftertheclassicalperiod.Followingmanydecadesforwhichwehearlittle,
for the later third centurywehave fromPlutarch (drawing,mostprobably, on
Phylarkhos) lavishlydetailed Lives of the careers of two kings, Agis IV and
Kleomenes III, both of whom undertook political and social revolution in
Lakoniaandcametopicturesqueends.Thefirstwas(controversially)hangedat
Sparta, theother isshownasnoblycommittingsuicideafteranattemptagainst
overwhelming odds to subvert Ptolemaic rule inAlexandria. The death of the
first,thatis,recallsthatoftheregentPausanias;incontrast,KleomenesinEgypt
recalls Leonidas at Thermopylai.12 After these dramatized episodes, and a last
flourish of colourful detail concerning the rulerNabis, Spartan history, for us,
abruptlyrevertsforthemostparttodarkness.
These narrative episodes with their binary morality, their interest in death,
their frequent insistence on the qualities of individuals and on the Spartan
constitution, all seem likely to have derived their fundamental character from
storiestoldatSparta.Spartanpreoccupationwithpreserving(or, inthecaseof
the two thirdcentury kings,with restoring) the supposedlytraditional constitu
tion seems to have generated a narrative pattern: those leaders whose pre






homoioi, were in retrospect enduringly vilified, while those whose qualities
promoted that regime were glowingly eulogized, in both cases with special
attentiontothecircumstancesoftheirdeaths.Muchof‘Spartanhistory’,wemust
suspect,originatednot as anabstract exercise in truthtellingbut as a constitu
tionalinstrument.
Eventhemostrecentandpertinenthistory,thetrueoutlinesofwhichwould
predictablyemergebefore long,couldbe falsifiedfor thesakeofSparta’swell
being. Xenophon shows that Sparta’s resounding naval defeats at Arginousai
(406)andKnidos(394)wereinitiallyandwithconsciousmendacitypresentedby
Spartan commanders elsewhere as victories, through concern to protect the
moraleof their troops.13Theutterancesofmendaciouspartisans are,however,
veryfarfrombeinghistoricallyvalueless.WemistrustthepointswhichSpartans
allegewith the greatest emphasis and colour, as for example thatKleomenes I




taken for granted andused tounderpin thedesiredconclusion.Divinationhas
this significant, implicit, role in several of the abovementioned narratives.
Implicitly,LeonidaswasnotactingagainstSpartannormsinvoluntarilytakinga
smallarmyto itsdestructionbecausehetrustedaDelphicoracle. (Contrast the
reaction that might be expected in our own times if it were shown that a
commander in the Second World War had deployed forces in response to
astrology.) The conspiracy ofKinadonwas said to have been discovered by a
mantisactinginhisofficialcapacity.Hadtherenotbeengeneralrespectforsuch
inspiredfindings,thereferencetodivinationmighthaveinduceddoubtastothe
reality of the affair, inherently obscure as itwas.And so above all in the plot
allegedagainstLysandros;mostofthemachinationsascribedtothedeadgeneral






retrospect on the PersianWars of 48079. For Spartans, as forAthenians, the
(ultimately) victorious campaigns of that period were used with hindsight for
proud selfdefinition. The degree of transmitted detail about the antiPersian




which preceded and followed. And we are readily on guard against patriotic
distortionsconcerningaperiodinwhichanyuglyfailureswereparticularlylikely
tobeglossedoverorexcludedfromtherecord.Theperformanceofdivination
might also be remembered with special interest. For Sparta, as for Athens,
HerodotostellsoforacularutterancefromDelphoiwhichdrewtheattentionof
military leaders: respectively, Leonidas and Themistokles. There are, however,
interestingdifferences.
According to Herodotos, Delphoi had prophesied to Sparta with explicit
ambiguityontheeveofthewar(VII,220):eithertheSpartanswouldloseagreat
andnoblecity,sackedby‘mendescendedfromPerseus’,orSpartawouldmourn
thedeathof a kingofHeraclid descent, onewhomeven the strengthof lions









was killed by the Persians; the correspondence is too neat.14 The Delphic
authorities could, of course, have been informed in advance by Spartans that
Leonidas would be leader of an exceptionally dangerous campaign, andmight
haveprophesiedaccordingly.Herodotossaysthattheprophecywasissuedwhen
Sparta consulted the shrine ‘about thiswar, right at its start’ (περt τοvπολwxου
τοzτουα|τ}κακατ’ρχsγειροxwνου); that is,probably tooearly forLeonidas’
roletobeknown.Butprecisechronologyiscommonlyamongthefirstelements
to be lost inmemory.Whatmakes the prophecy particularly suspicious is the
uncharacteristic risk of clear refutation that the oracle would have taken in
makingit:quiteconceivablySpartawouldsurviveunsacked,andLeonidasnotbe
killed. The two outcomes covered too little; in this case the imputedDelphic
ambiguitywastooprecise.
Theprophecieswhich,accordingtoHerodotos(VII,13943),weregivento
Athens by Delphoi make an instructive contrast. They clearly implied the
destructionoftheAthenianAkropolis,alessboldprediction,sinceAthens,north
oftheIsthmos,wasmoreexposedtoaPersianarmy,andthebattleofMarathon
hadgiven thePersians a special reason for targeting theplacevindictively.But
moreimportantly,theoracleisvaguerastothe‘woodenwall’whichalonewould






had failed, the oracle could protect its credit by claiming that it had meant
‘woodenwall’ toapply (forexample) toflightbysea: the termwasquitevague
rather than ambiguous as between precise alternatives. In the case of the
prophecies reportedly given to Athens, Herodotos has provided elaborately
detailedcontext:hetellsofthestrikingcircumstancesoftheconsultation,andthe
desperatepressureappliedbytheAthenianenvoysinthefaceofinitialDelphic
pessimism.Henames thePythia andoneof the leadingmenofDelphoiwho
intervenedinthematter:respectively,AristonikeandTimonsonofAndroboulos




theAthenians, against theopinionof the (unofficial)oraclespecialists (khresmo
logoi),thatthereferencestothe‘woodenwall’andtoSalamispointedtoasuccess







They might claim, for example, that the consultation of Delphoi had been
performedbythePythioi,theking’smenafterall,andthatthekings,intowhose
control the response duly came, had decided not todivulge its contents. Such
wouldbeinkeepingwithLeonidas’noblemotives,ingoingtohisdeathwitheyes
open, as later believed; it would accord with the general Spartan practice of
secrecy,observedbyThucydides(V,68,2),andwiththemanipulationofnewsin
the interest of morale, as later described by Xenophon. Delphoi, which had




δ καt δεξιοττοs:Hdt.,VIII, 124)was initially reveredby the Spartans.Hero
dotos and Athenian speakers at Sparta, reported by Thucydides, attest to his
havingbeenhonouredbytheSpartansmorethananyotherforeigner(Hdt. l.c.;
Thuc.,Ι,74,1).FromHerodotoswealsohear,oftheperiodjustbeforethewar,
that the only nonSpartan whom (with his brother) the Spartans respected
enoughtomaketheirfellowcitizenwasadiviner,whoseskills(asweshallsee)
the Spartans were exceptionally anxious to use as war approached. Since, as
Herodotoswouldlaterpresentit,partofThemistokles’masteryofaffairsbefore
thearrivalofthePersiansinAttikewastoseeandimposethecorrectinterpreta
tion of alarming Delphic prophecy in a military crisis, we might consider the
 Divination,Royalty,andInsecurityinClassicalSparta 43
possibility that part of the reason for his exceptionalwelcome at Spartawas his
ownclevernessinthematterofdivination.15Itispossiblethatintheaftermathof
the PersianWarsDelphoi and (for a while) Themistokles enjoyed at Sparta a
recordofhaving(respectively)issuedandinterpretedsuccessfuldivinationwhen
itwasmostneeded.





lavish grants of land, and so presumably with citizenship also, by the state of
Kroton in connection with a war of the late sixth century. Tisamenos was
repeatedlyinvitedbySpartabeforeXerxes’invasiontoissuedivinationasSparta’s
agent;initially,accordingtoHerodotos,theSpartansofferedmoneybut,astheir
fear grew great in the face of imminent Persian attack and they wanted him
‘terribly’(δεινs),theyagreedtoTisamenos’demandthatheandhisbrotherbe
given Spartan citizenship. It is hard to overemphasize the significance of the
details we possess on Tisamenos, as they bear on Spartan retrospective attitudes
towards him and his craft in Herodotos’ time, the second half of the fifth
century.ThetermswhichHerodotosusesforSparta’soriginalinvitationmaywell
seemextraordinary,foranystateatanyperiod:theSpartanswantedTisamenosto




share the actual command in war, for in comparison with this the grant of
citizenshipwouldbenothing. It seems to refer to thepositionof the kings as
priests,sincetheyofferedsacrificebeforeallimportantundertakings(Xen.,L.P.,
13). Tisamenus was to act with them in this.’ Herodotos’ picture is indeed
remarkable:Sparta–thatxenophobestate–wantedaforeigner,onewhowould
advertise his lackof loyaltybynegotiating stubbornly and at arm’s lengthwith
those inviting him, to impinge on the sovereignty of its revered hereditary
authorities inmattersof life anddeath for the community.At the rootof this
Spartandesirewas,accordingtoHerodotos,notmerelythefactthatTisamenos
wasanIamidbutalsothebeliefthatDelphoihadprophesiedthathewouldwin




ecy about Leonidas was respectful rivalry with Athens, in the matter of strategic prophecy.





dotos, first atPlataia (against thePersians), then atTegea againstTegeates and
Argives, later atDipaieis againstmost of the Arkadians, at Isthmos (Ithome?)
againsttheMessenians,andfinallyatTanagraagainstAtheniansandArgives(IX,




ThatHerodotoshad informationfromaSpartansourceon thesematters is
strongly suggestedby internal details.Thehistorian reportswith emphasis that
Tisamenosandhisbrotherweretheonly foreignersever (xοvνοιδδ) tohave
receivedSpartancitizenship.Ofsimilarform,andsimilarlylikelytobeofSpartan




century that the Spartans had ‘succeeded in all their otherwars andhad failed
only(xοzνουs)againsttheTegeans’(I,65).Statementsinvolvingalargeclaimto
historicalknowledge,qualifiedbyanadmissionofarareexceptiontoanalleged
rule, occurwith special frequency in Spartan contexts, somuch so as to form
something like a signature of origin.We think of Thucydides’ report that the
Spartanswere(bytheirstandards)exceptionallyhastyinconsideringsevereaction
in the case of king Agis (V, 63, 2), or indeed of his statement about Sparta’s
normal judicious slowness – in the context of the official killing of regent
Pausanias(I,132,5;cf.Plut.,Ages.,32).InconnectionwithareportthatSpartans
on the battlefield (in 418) had become quite exceptionally disoriented by their
standards,ThucydidessignalshisSpartansourceexplicitly:theeventwasunique
‘in thememory of the Spartans’ (xλιστα δΛακεδαιxnνιοι ς  xwxνηντο ν
τοzτ τ καιρ ξεπλγησαν, V, 66, 1f.). In all these cases we detect one
underlying elementof apologia: Spartawas a consistentlywellrun and successful
state, in keeping with its claim to have enjoyed the same constitution for
centuries. There was homogeneity down the years, as there was among the
citizenry,thehomoioi,atanyonetime.Discordanteventshadtobeclearlylabelled
as rare or unique. So no doubt with the ‘unique’ grant of citizenship to Ti
samenos and his brother, one eminently in need of apology for a statewhere
xenophobia, in the form of xenelasia, could be institutionalised.17 The apologia
may have gone further. Pindar, inOl. 6 (27ff.), tells that Iamos, eponymous
ancestoroftheEleanclanofdivinerstowhichTisamenosbelonged,wasbornof
one Evadne who herself had been conceived and born at Sparta, in a union

17AristotleknewofaSpartantraditionaccordingtowhichforeignershadbeenadmittedas
citizens, in the state’s early days:Pol., 1270a.Onewonderswhether the acute oliganthropy of
Sparta inhis timehadcommendedachange inpolicy towardsgrantingcitizenship, and thusa
correspondinglydifferentpictureofSpartanhistorytoserveasprecedent.
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legitimating the Spartan citizenship of Tisamenos and his brother, as being
themselves of Spartan origin.18 This ode is dated to 472 or 468; at l.9396 it
mentionsHieronofSyracuse(obit466)asstillalive.Itmaythustestifyindirectly
toSpartan reverenceofTisamenos at aperioddecades earlier than the textof
Herodotos.We shall see that relatives of Tisamenos were eminent diviners at




theGreeks adopted. In this connection (ΙΧ, 37) the historian also gives detail
about the leading diviner in the enemy camp, another Elean, by the name of
Hegesistratos.Again, theaccounthasaSpartanperspective.ThisElean,weare
told,hadpreviouslybeencaught andcondemned to executionby theSpartans




were amazed at the daring of theman (Herodotos’ admiration, then,matched
thatoftheSpartans).HegesistratosescapedtoTegeabut‘intheendhishatredof
theSpartansdidnotprofithim’;forhewascaughtbytheSpartanswhileactingas











purposes, a shrine could not offer the necessary service.Before a campaign, a

18PARKE(1967),p.176,citingWilamowitz.








Thuc., I,111,5;Plut.,Peric.,21.)Butat shortnotice, in the faceof theenemy,
there was usually no question of consultingDelphoi, let alone remote shrines
such as those ofDodone or ZeusAmmon. Likewise in thematter of precise
timing in a campaign–akeyelement in the thinkingofSpartans inparticular.
Oraclescouldhardlypretendtoregulateallsuchthings.
Now,inspiteofthewidespreadreluctanceofmanyscholarsinearliergenera
tions to engagewith ancient testimony to the influenceofdivination, scholarly
monographswerewritten on oracles: one thinks in particular of the calm and
systematic studies by H.W. Parke. Modern cultures are familiar with textual





sation is readily available: omens incur from the start insoluble problems of
definition. Whether even eclipses were numinous events may well have been
contestedinthelatefifthcentury.21Thepointconcerningdefinitionisillustrated
byananecdoteaboutaSpartan:whenmanteisclaimedasanomenthediscovery
of a snake wrapped around a (large) key, he asserted that this was no omen,
whereasifthekeyhadwrappeditselfaroundthesnake,thatwouldhavebeen.22
However, somewhat similarproblemsoccurwithoracularutterances.Notonly
are modern writers properly exercised by the question of which oracular
predictionsrecordedfromantiquitywere infactcomposedafter theevent; it is
difficulttobesurewhetheranyparticularrecordedoracularprophecyisgenuine.
The credit of oracular textswas qualified in antiquity by sourcecriticism, both
subtle,asinThucydides’remarkaboutthetendencyforpropheciestobeadjusted
retrospectly tosuit thesupposedlyprophesiedevent (II,54,3),andplain,as in
Spartan (andAthenian) belief that onoccasion corruptionhadoccurred at the






theories, near the endofPerikles’ life. Plut.,Nic., 23, 2 attributes even to themass ofNikias’





reporters of Delphic prophecy, to be utterly honest, neither adding to nor
subtracting from theutteranceof the shrine.24WhenTacituswroteofmendacio
pretium(Hist.IV,81),rewardforlying,hewasthinkingofreportedomensinthe
GraecoRomanworld,butthephrasemightapplytooraclestoo.
It is perhaps the public effects of recorded prophecies, rather than their
origins,which formthemore fruitful fieldof study, though the twocannotbe
dissociated.And,forthisstudyofancientreception,omensmaywellturnoutto
be themore important category.For,whileoraclesoriginated in circumstances
whichfewwitnessed,andsoweregenerallyopentoquestion,theeventswhich





with some reservation, and describes its effect, early in that war, on ‘those
[Athenians]whoknewaboutit’(II,54,4;cf.I,118,3;123,1f.,andbelow,n.30).





he writes (VIII, 41): ‘they [the Athenians] hurried… wishing to obey the
[Delphic]prophecybutmainlyforthefollowingreason:…’.Andheproceedsto
tellofareport,originatingwiththepriestessofAthena,thatalargesnakewhich
normally lived in the shrine as guardian of theAkropolis, had disappeared; its
usual meal of honeycakes had been left untouched. This was taken by ‘the
Athenians’asasignthatAthenaherselfhadabandonedtheAkropolis.Werecall
the relative weight given inHerodotos’ account to the origins of theDelphic
prophecyaboutthefatesofSpartaandLeonidasascomparedwithhisdetailon
the seerTisamenos.Was the extentof this concentrationonomensperhaps a
peculiarity of the historian? Was he perhaps conducting a special defence of
omens?Furthercommentwhichhemakesontheaffairofthesacredsnakemay
suggestsomethingverydifferent.Heseemstoinvitedoubtastotherealityofthe
snake. Twice he uses λwγουσι, ‘they say’, of the Athenian belief in it; he also
writes, ‘andmoreovertheyputoutsacrificialofferingstoiteverymonthasif it









of 8line hexameter oracle]…When Bakis speaks so clearly on such matters
neitherdoIdaremyselftoutteranargumentchallengingoraclesnordoIaccept
suchfromothers’(VIII,77).InexplainingwhyAtheniansmightputmorefaith
in anomen concerning anunseen snake than in a reportedDelphicprophecy,




Spartan practice in the matter of taking sacrificial omens seems to have
evolved in a spirit of sourcecriticism, to minimise the chance of fraud or of
wishfulperception.OfXenophon’stime,acenturyafterthePersianinvasionsof
Greece, we read that when a Spartan king sacrifices in connection with a
campaign,thefollowingareinattendance‘aroundthesacrifice’(περtτνθυσ}αν):
… polemarchs, lokhagoi, pentekonteres, leaders of allied mercenary contingents,
commandersof thebaggage train, and anyonewhowishes (£βουλnxενοs) of the
generalsofthe(allied)cities.Twooftheephorsarealsopresent;theydonotactin
anyinterventionistway(πολυπραγxονοvσιxνο|δwν),unlessthekinginvitesthem.
But their presence,watchingwhat each person does, keeps everyone in order, as
onewould expect. Andwhen the sacrifice is completed, the king summons eve




critically, with a view to its author’s context and intentions. In the first place,
Xenophonmayhavebeenwritinginconsciousdefenceofthekingforwhomhe
composedaformaleulogy(theAgesilaos).Agesilaos(kingfrom400to360)was
for decades the most powerful individual at Sparta, and thus was eminently
exposedtocriticismin thatofficially levellingculture.Elsewhere inourpresent
text, theLak.Pol., Xenophon insists on the claim that at Sparta, unlike other
Greek cities, the ‘most powerful’ (i.e. the hereditary rich) act with proper
deference towards the officers appointed by the city (VIII, 2). Plutarch in his
Agesilaos (ch.4) represents that king as eagerly hurrying to obey the ephors, or
risingtohisfeetindeferencetothem.Suchstatementsofidealimplicitlysuggest
a criticism: the power of Agesilaosmeant that hemight have disobeyed if he
wished, perhaps indeed that he did on occasion allegedly overstep the mark.
Similarlywiththeephors:theydidnotactatsacrificesininterventionistfashion.
The verbusedhere, πολυπραγxονεν, is noteworthy. InXenophon’s day itwas
pungently pejorative: πολυπραγxοσzνηhad been, formany, a besetting fault of









while the ephors themselves duly respected the king’s prerogative. Whether
matters were in reality quite so well adjusted wemay doubt. But Xenophon’s




…insistent thoughXenophon is that this isa trulypublicexaminationofen
trails,thereisnodoubtthatthedominantfigureattheceremonyistheking.Inthis
passage Xenophon simply fails tomention the professional seer whomust have
providedtheformalinterpretationofthesacrifice.Theritewasintheorypublicand
objective,inpracticeundertheclosesupervisionoftheking…thewholeconduct
of the ceremony lessened the likelihood of serious conflict between human and
divinewill(1989,p.157).
Thisargumentis importantfortherationalisingelementinParker’swork.It
may, however, be challenged, not least in respect of the omitted seer.28Xeno
phon was not writing in an anthropological spirit. His Lak. Pol. has as its
advertised aim to explain the uniqueness of Sparta’s success (I, 1), and is
accordinglystructuredaroundpointsofcontrastbetweenSpartaandotherGreek
states.Twoinstancesofsuchhavealreadybeennoted:theSpartansasuniquely
specialised in war, and their kings as unusually obedient to other officials, as
comparedwith(rich)Greekselsewhere.Therearemanyotherreferencesinthe




would not have advanced Xenophon’s main thesis andmight for that reason
havebeenpassedoverwithoutcomment,asbeingbanalandreadilyinferred.Itis
possible that therelationsofseeranddyarchwerenotalwayswhatsecularising
modern scholars may assume them to have been. And in particular one may
suspect that the influence of a Spartan king in propheticmatters was not the






was free to participate. But in the Spartan context described here by Xenophon there is no








mightgive to themantisacertain influence,achance tomanoeuvreasbetween
thedifferentparties.
DivinationandtheSpartanconstitution
Measurements conducted in fairly recent times (on the British population
duringtheSecondWorldWar)30bearoutremarkablythesuggestionmadebyan
AthenianspeakerinThucydides,31andamplifiedbythelatter’snarrative,thatthe
influence of divination (or, in themodern case, of astrology) is greatest when
secularargumentsyieldleastsecurity.CompareHerodotosonthewaygreatfear
of the Persian invasion impelled Sparta to employ Tisamenos. In crises, argu
ments from the supernaturalmay supplyhopewhenother calculations tend to
pessimism.32 Behind Sparta’s insistent claims to have a stable constitution (cf.




























planning revolution.33 In this crisis, too, itwouldbe rational to fear that some
mightprefer todealwith theascendantenemybynegotiation, even if treason
able, rather than by warfare. We might well ask, accordingly, how confident
Spartanswereintheirownconstitutionalsolidity,inthecompetenceandloyalty







he is recorded as having organised antiSpartan moves among the Arkadians
(Hdt., VI, 74).Whether or not he died by suicide, as seemingly in the official
account(colourfullydetailed:Hdt.,VI,75),theenmityofotherleadingSpartans
towards him is clear.34 Damaratos, the dyarch whose ejection Kleomenes had
earliersecuredwiththeaidofDelphicdivination(Hdt.,VI,66),hadgoneoverto
thePersians,andisrecordedbyHerodotosashavingaccompaniedthemontheir
invasion (e.g. VII, 101). He had been keenly pursued across Greece at the
beginningofhis exile, in awaywhichmay suggest that theSpartanauthorities
planned to kill him (Hdt.,VI, 70): subsequently other exiled kings,Pleistoanax
and(intheearlyfourthcentury)Pausanias,arerecordedaslivinginsanctuary,in
an attempt to use Sparta’s religious inhibitions to restrain the state’s possibly
lethalintentions.IntheaftermathofthePersianinvasion,Damaratos’successor,
kingLeotykhidas,victoriouscommanderat thebattleofMykale,wasexiledfor




plottingwithPersiaandforarevolution involvingSparta’shelots (Thuc., Ι,95,
12834). It is hard to imagine evidence of greater suspicion towards Sparta’s
hereditarydyarchs–shortofactualoverthrowoftheinstitution.













were an anomaly among the homoioi. Their positionwould inevitably recall the
ancien régime. Their heirsapparent seemingly did not participate in the homo
genisingSpartaneducation.36AnoteworthyqualityofclassicalSparta,perhapsthe
mostimportantoneforexplainingSparta’ssuccessunderitsaustereregime,was
specialism. We recall Xenophon’s words about the Spartans as the only true
military specialists, or his description of the martial images produced under
AgesilaosatEphesosasresemblinga‘workshopofwar’.37SomeSpartanhomoioi
had a further specialism,passed from father to son, asheralds,aulosplayersor
cooksacrificers.38 Yet here too the dyarchs compared awkwardly. Excluded as
they might be from the militaristic education system, they were nonetheless
Sparta’sseniorgenerals.Asmembersofthegerousiatheyhadanenduringrolein




under the austere system. Such thoughts perhaps allow us better to evaluate




with the frighteningly anomalous, generalist dyarchs by bringing in a specialist.
Eliswasclearlyfamedfor itsdiviners; thecaseof theEleanseerHegesistratos,
dreaded at Sparta around the time of the Persian invasion, makes the point,
perverselybutclearly.AndtheIamidai,towhichTisamenosbelonged,followeda
family traditionof specialism39 like Sparta’s own specialist heralds, aulosplayers
and cooksacrificers. Tisamenos’ Elean origins were indeed inmarked tension
withSparta’sgeneralmistrustofoutsiders.Buthisspecialismchimedexactlywith
theLakonianausteresystem.
Itmay beworth speculating briefly about how the then dyarchs Leotykhidas
andLeonidasmighthavereactedtoTisamenos’appointment.Onthefaceofit,
they might be expected to oppose the sharing of their military authority (as
Herodotosdescribesit)withthisnewcomer.Whetherthesekingsweretempera
mentally such as to welcome guidance in the coming exceptional danger we
cannot guess. But eachmight have understood, following the royal careers of
Damaratos and Kleomenes, that other Spartan authorities might doubt their
integrity.KingLeotykhidas had already received an unforgettable lesson in the









forroyalty togiveway,rather in thespiritof the legendarySpartankingTheo




pain;he at leastwasnotoneof thoseSpartanswhohad in recent times acted
severelyagainstDamaratos,KleomenesorLeotykhidas.
Earthquakeandhelotrevolt
In (or near) 465/4 the Spartans were struck by what Thucydides was to
describe simply as ‘the great earthquake’ (I, 128,1).He gives (ibid.) the reason
whytheearthquakeoccurred, ‘as they [theSpartans] think’; thepresent tense is




This event, long remembered as we see, involved for Sparta two intimate
disasters. Later accounts stressed the damage in the vital area of citizen num
bers.40AndtherewasawidespreadrevoltoftheMessenianhelots,inaccordance
with theprinciple later formulatedbyAristotle, that thehelots ‘lie inwait,as it





Comparable is the Athenians’ reaction when unseasonal (as they thought)
weather afflicted their retreat from Syracuse: they thought that ‘this too’ (in
addition to the lunar eclipse – andmuch else) had been sent to destroy them
(Thuc.,VII,79,3).Andheretootherewasasupposedsinavailabletoexplainthe
divine hostility. Nikias in 413 is reported by Thucydides as suggesting to his
demoralisedmen that Athens’ action in attacking Syracusemight indeed have
attracted divine punishment (though he argued that any such punishmentwas




40 HODKINSON (2000), p. 417f. for ancient references and modern analysis. CARTLEDGE





sufficient to deter the relevant action in the first place.But, in both cases, the
religiousinterpretationwouldbemadeplausibleinretrospectbyasetofunusual
events pointing in the one direction. The earthquake was rare in its severity,
witnessThucydides’phrase‘thegreatearthquake’.Similarlyhewoulddescribethe
fateof thevastAthenianexpeditionagainstSyracuseasunique in its scaleand
thoroughness (VII, 87, 5f.). And in each case the human agentswho inflicted
muchofthesupposedpunishmentwereclearlyinasensethesamepeopleashad
been the victims of the original supposed offence. It was Syracusewhich had
crushedtheAthenianfleetandwasrealisticallyexpectedtocrushinturntheland






great victory for the Spartans against theMessenians at ‘Isthmos’ (or perhaps
‘Ithome’). Inanycase, thepositionwhichHerodotosassigns to thisvictory, in
hischronologicallyorderedlist,issomewherebetweenthebattlesofPlataia(479)
andofTanagra (458or 457); the timing is thus appropriate for theMessenian
revoltwhich followed thegreatearthquake.Now,even ifSpartanshad, shortly
aftertheearthquake,reflectedontheirownpossibleresponsibilityforit,amighty
victory over theMessenians, such as Herodotos records, would have severely
interfered with any such religious interpretation. But helping to establish the
religiousinterpretationasSpartanorthodoxywasthesuccessoftheMessenians
in holding out against the Spartans for many years on Mount Ithome. In
explaining why the Spartans, after this long war, let the rebel Messenians go,
Thucydides records that ‘the Lakedaimonians had had in their possession for
sometime(πρ¤τοv),anoraclefromthePythiasayingtoletgothesuppliantof
Zeusof Ithome’ (Ι, 103, 2).Here the indicationofwhen thisoracle supposedly
was issued is of great significance. Sparta evidently couldnot claim that it had
been issued at the timewhen thehelotswere in fact released.Accordingly the
possibility of fraud should arise in ourminds; itwould also probably occur to
someof the Spartans themselves, to those, that is,whowere not privy to any
manipulation.Inmentioningnottheissuingoftheoraclebutthepossessionofit,
Thucydides’description shouldmakeus thinkof thedyarchs’ storeofDelphic
prophecies.The reference to releasinga suppliantofZeuscorrespondednicely
withthesupposedoffenceofkillingsuppliants, thoseofPoseidon,hisbrother:








about Ithome appears to resemble that concerning the Persian invasion and
Leonidas: it both significantly lacks a detailed origin and helped to pass off in
retrospect a Spartan military defeat as divinely ordained, indeed as an act of
virtue.Duringthisepisode,firmerreligiousconvictionsintheSpartansprobably
arose from publiclyknown events imputable to divinity, the earthquake and
consequentrevolt.Interpretingsuchwouldappropriatelybetheworkofamantis





Spartansnot topress foroutrightvictory this time,hiswordswere likely tobe
taken very seriously.On this occasion, indeed, his prophecymight be an easy
one:notonlywouldheverylikelyknowwhattheSpartanswishedhimtosay,but















than they point to enemy virtues. Such is more in keeping with renascent
optimism.Onecanhopetoalterone’sownperformancemorereadilythanthat
of an enemy. The second element, concerning Apollo’s own partisanship (he










WhereasSparta in theearly440shad intervenedmilitarily to restorecontrolof
Delphoi to native authorities,Athens hadmounted an intervention of its own
shortly afterwards to put the shrine back under the control of its then ally
Phokis.43SoThucydidesrecords(I,112,5),withthebrevitywhichhecharacteris
tically applies to notices of religion at work in politics.44 Following Athens’
definitivelossofpowerinCentralGreeceshortlyafterwards,throughthebattle
ofKoroneia(447or446),itisvirtuallycertainthattheoraclewasby431firmly
under thecontrolofnativeDelphianswithan interest infavouringSpartaover
Athens.
Early in thePeloponnesianWar thecreditof theDelphicoraclemusthave
beenhighatSparta.ForplagueravagedAthens,twice,destroyingalargeminority
of the population. Thucydides observes that the plague, so spectacularly
contagious among the Athenians (it spread to the Athenian force besieging
distantPoteidaiaandravagedthat too:II,58),barelyaffected thePeloponnese.
Hemakes thisobservation in the contextofAthenian concern that theplague
was divinely sent, in accordancewith theDelphic prophecy.Writing of ‘those




The plague would readily be seen as Apollo’s work for a reasonwhich, for a
Greek readership,Thucydideshadnoneed tomake explicit.Apollowas tradi
tionallyseenasthesenderofdisease: theIliadhadmemorablyopenedwiththe
god in that role (I,43ff.).Thucydides reportsPerikleshimself,whenexplaining










employing divinationhad ‘made theAthenians hope (πλπισαν) to capture Sicily’ (cf. POWELL
1979a).Hornblower rightly describes this as ‘a huge analepsis’ (2009, 257).Our knowledge of
Greek divination suffers, as Hornblower observes, from ‘the many religious silences of
Thucydides’(1991,183).Hewriteselsewhere(1992,170), ‘ThereligioussilencesofThucydides
areintheirwayquiteasscandalousasthepoliticalsilencesofXenophon,forwhichheissooften





the useful effect, perhaps intended, of confirming for the reader the reality of such credulous
behaviourashedoesrecord.
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withSparta,we should reckon that the sameconsiderationswhichbrought the
Athenians to that view would impress Spartans above all. A distinguishing
elementoftheirculturewasitsresistancetowishfulthinkingintheidentification




the fullscale land battle which would have played to her strength. Regular
invasions of Attike and destruction of crops had not brought Athens to her
knees.Sparta’sessaysatnavalpowerhadfailed,andwiththecaptureofsome120
Spartan citizens on Sphakteria in 425 theAthenians acquired hostages of high
status.Fear for their fate precluded further assaults onAttike. Sparta’smilitary
reputationabroad,onwhichdependedhercapacitytoattractandmobiliseallies,
wasdamagedbythesuspicionthattheSpartanshad‘gonesoft’(xαλακ}αν,Thuc.,
V,75,3).AsAthensseizedKythera, the largeandstrategic islandoffsouthern
Lakonia, Sparta had cause to fear a helot uprising. Thucydides reports, in
summaryand indetail, thatSpartacameclose topanic.Torecover thecitizen
prisoners,repeatedandunsuccessfuloffersweremadetoAthenstoendthewar.
In the process of demoralisation, religious prophecy was again involved. The
Delphic prophecy about the war might now seem to fit events even more
convincingly than it had when the plague hit Athens. For Apollo had also






in circumstances of extreme prejudice, became awkwardly relevant oncemore.
KingPleistoanax,whohadledaninvasionofAttikein446whichdidnotleadto
victory,orindeedtobattle,hadthenbeenexiledonachargeofbribery(Thuc.,V,
16,3).That thechargewasrealistic, that itmighthaveconvincedand incensed
numerousSpartans,issuggestednotjustbyinformationfromtheAthenianside
ofunspecifiedspecialexpenditureinthisconnection,46butbyThucydides’report
that in exile Pleistoanax, surelywell informed, felt it wise to live in a building
whichlaypartlywithinareligioussanctuary,theshrineofZeusatMountLykaion
inArkadia–‘forfearoftheSpartans’.Heevidentlyreckonedthathismereexile
would not satisfy all, that he might be mercilessly pursued abroad as his
predecessorDamaratoshadbeen,but that as a suppliantofZeushemightbe
protected from Spartan wrath for the same religious reason that Sparta had





‘suppliants of Zeus’. Now ‘in the 19th year’ of his exile (427 or thereabouts)
Pleistoanax was allowed to return to Sparta, and was accorded extreme and
publicevidencethathisstatustherewouldthenceforwardbeofthehighest.His
returnwastobegreetedwith‘thesamechorusesandsacrificesaswhentheyfirst




such remote details of internal Spartan history? How characteristic it was of
Spartans to stress the continuity of Lacedaemonianhistory over a vast period!
Pleistoanaxwould be nomere figurehead. Thucydides sees his disposition for
peaceasamainreasonforSparta’sdétentewithAthensin421(V,1617,1;cf.V,
33,1;75,1forhissubsequentmilitarycommands).Now,torestoretoaposition
at the head of the state amanwho hadmuch reason to be vengeful towards
those who had driven him into exile, in such humiliating and frightening
circumstancesandforsolong,clearlythreatenedstasis.AndSparta,asherwhole
historyshows,wasbyGreekstandardsexceptionally–eventhoughnotconsis





oracle had told the Spartans to ‘bringback the seedof the semidivine sonof
Zeus from the foreign land to his own.Otherwise they would plough with a
silverploughshare’.ThedescendantofZeusinquestionwouldbetakentobethe
exiled king (the two royal families claimed, like certain other Spartans, descent
fromHerakles, thedemigodsonofZeus),andthepointaboutasilverplough
sharepresumablymeant toactwastefullyor invain.Thesoftnessof themetal
mighthavebeenmeanttoalludenotonlytoinefficientploughingbuttomilitary
ineffectiveness,‘softness’asxαλακ}α.Thucydides’wordsinreportingthisDelphic






consultations in question belong to the years immediately preceding the actual












‘according to her might’? One can readily imagine Sparta thinking it worth












plague.Andnowagainst theking,and indeedagainst thecreditof theDelphic
priestess, theking’senemieswere invokingotherevents interpretedasdivinely
sent,namelySparta’sfailuresinthewar.AgainwenoticeinThucydidesasubtle
indicationofthefrequencyofthisdivination:ithappened‘regularly’,‘whenever’
therewasa setback.Spartanswereclearly impressedby this setof accusations.
AccordingtoThucydides,itwastogetridofthecriticismthatPleistoanaxsought
a period of peace. In peacetime there was less reason to expect disasters that
enemiescouldexploitpoliticallyagainsthimself(V,17,1).
Spartan consistency in interpreting setbacks as divine punishment emerges
fromafurtherpassageofThucydides.AtVII,18,23hedescribestheSpartans’




been a formal offence (παρανnxηxα, used twice) of their own, their own fault
(σφ}σι…ρxρτητο).Theyhadbeenthemoreblameworthy:theoutbreakofwar
hadproceededfromtheirside.Whereasithadbeenstipulatedinthetreatythen
applying that there shouldbeno fighting ifone sidewerewilling to submit to
arbitration, they had not heededAthens’ call for such. For these reasons they
now thought that their ill fortune had been predictable (ε¥κnτωs δυστυχεν…
νnxιζον)andtheytooktoheartthedisasteratPylosandeveryothersetbackthey
had suffered. The word which Thucydides here uses for ‘took to heart’,
νεθυxοvντο, is cognate with the term νθυx}αwhich the historian uses when
describingthelinkrepeatedlymadebyPleistoanax’enemiesbetweenthealleged
illicit action (παρανοxηθεσαν) of the king towards theDelphic oracle and the
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setbacks sufferedby Sparta.When in Sicily, later in 413, itwas theAthenians’
turn to do pessimistic divination in a climate of guilt, Thucydides’ phrase is
νθzxιονποιοzxενοι(VII,50,4).
TheSpartans’ideathattheyhadbeenwrongtoembarkwithoutarbitrationon
war against Athens in 431 raises a question about the credit of the Delphic
prophecy issuedat that time.Howcouldthemoralityofthewarbedoubted if
ApollohimselfhadbeensoemphaticallybelligerentontheSpartans’side?How
couldthegodhave,albeitconditionally,predictedSpartanvictory(above,n.42)if
Sparta’s faultswere going predictably (ε¥κnτωs) to lead to a bad outcome?We




its side. Divisions between Apollo and his father Zeus were still conceivable;
though when, after the Peloponnesian War, a Spartan king asked Delphoi
whetherApollowas in agreementwith a divinatory response already issuedby
‘hisfather’ZeusatOlympia(Xen.,Hell.IV,7,2;Ar.,Rhet.,1398b),hispurpose
was probably to apply pressure, to exploit a presumption thatDelphicApollo
wouldrepresent,asusual,thewillofZeus.Inseekingtoexplainwhyby414/3
Apollo’s supportof eighteen years earlierhad apparently little remainingmoral
force, we might be tempted to invoke simple passage of time. But again we
remember how an oracle apparently far fromnewor of clear origin had been
deployed by Spartan authorities to justify letting go the helots ofMt. Ithome.




The authenticity of prophecies fromdistant shrineswas always beyond the
capacity of most to perceive. Oracles from Delphoi passed to Sparta along
channelscontrolledbyroyalty,andthecreditofkingsatSpartawas,formanyin
ourperiod,frequentlylowornonexistent.Wecanexplaintheascendancyofthe
divination involving setbacks and guilt in part because it invoked the direct
experiencesofmostSpartans.Itwasbasedonthingstheycouldsee.AndSparta






49 POWELL (1989). The commander of the Ten Thousand in Asia, Cheirisophos, who is,





…ν) to see firstAgesilaos then the other soldierswearing garlands…which
they offered up to the goddessArtemis [patroness ofEphesos]. Forwherever
menrevere thegods, trainforwarandpractise toobeytheauthorities, there it










brought suffering upon Spartans. Thucydides,with emphasis and some repeti
tion,cites(likeXenophonlater)secularandreligiousconsiderationstogether.It
seemedtoSpartansagoodmomenttoattackbecauseAthenswouldbedistracted
by two wars, against themselves and against Sicilians. Spartans drew strength
(¨xη, VII, 18, 2; compare Xenophon’s περρσθη above, likewise used of





suffer for their demerits as Sparta once had for hers. Again, this optimism of
414/3instantiatesamarkedtendencyamongSpartans,theirespeciallyacuteform
of theGreek senseofkairos, ofmilitaryopportunity.50A timewhenanenemy
wasweakwasatimeforSparta,with its limitedmanpower, tostrike.Whatthe
presentpassageofThucydidesaddstoourknowledgeofthispatternisthat,for
Spartans,enemyweaknessmighttaketheformnotonlyofmilitaryexposure,as
identified by secular reasoning, but also of moral exposure, of setbacks to be
anticipated for religious reasons.Andnowwemay see a resemblancebetween
Spartan calculations, secular and religious, in 431 and in414/3. In431Athens
wasmilitarilyexposed,alargeproportionofitshoplitesfarawayatthesiegeof
Poteidaia.51 But she was religiously exposed as well, with Apollo asserting his
hostility.Bothconsiderations,thesecularandthedivinatory,mighthelptohurry
theSpartanstoaction,andmightevenhavehelpedtodeflect themfromtime










For Athens, after 413, we hear little about any influence of divination on
affairsofstate.ThedébâcleinSicilyhadledtomassangeragainst(inThucydides’




prophecy, which corresponds with detail he gives us about the extent and




decision to stay at Syracuse after the lunar eclipse did not involve any inherent
weakness in the art of divination.53 The discredit into which soothsaying had
fallenamongmanyAtheniansmayhavelastedlongaftertheSicilianexpedition.54
For Spartans we know of no such reason for religion to decline in influence.
There is, rather, a remarkable continuity in its prominence. Andmuch of the




anecdotesconcerning individualsand(especially) theirdeaths,made itprobable
thatLysandroswouldbeacutelyawareoftheneednottobeassimilatedtoone











54FLOWER (2008), p. 139 on the significant disappearance from Aristophanic comedy of
referencestochresmologoiafterthefailureoftheSicilianexpedition.ForrenewedAthenianregard
for military divination after the Peloponnesian War, see the epigraphic evidence concerning




explicable as an attempt to resist the assimilation. Such resistance was all the




In contrast to Pausanias (as portrayed in Spartan story), Lysandros did not
indulgeintheluxurywhichhissituationmadepossible.Wehearthatenormous
sumsofcashwhichcameintohishandsafterAigospotamoiweresenttoSparta





a policy of extreme ferocity towards defeated Athens.55 Towards Persia, the
power with which Pausanias had reportedly had private dealings, Lysandros
wouldagaintakeapositionofoutrightaggressionafterthedeathofthePersian
prince,Kyros,withwhomhehadbeenalliedinaccordancewithofficialSpartan




at Delphoi the victory of Aigospotamoi.56 But that monument involved a
conspicuousdifferencefromthephysicalrecordleftatDelphoibyPausaniasthe
regent. The latter had offended his peers at Sparta by using a monument at
Delphoi to name himself as the conqueror of theMedes (Thuc., I, 132, 13).
Lysandros’monumentsignalledhisownuniqueness:Pausaniastheperiegetetells
thatLysandroswasshownbeingcrownedbydivinity,byPoseidon(X,9,7).But
the monument also had statues of some thirty other naval commanders. Did
Lysandroshopebycreatingthissmallcrowdtoavoidtheresentmentarousedby
the regent’s singular claim? In addition there were statues of other intimate
colleagues:Lysandros’ steersmanand–mentionedfirstamongthesecolleagues
by our source – his mantis. The latter’s name, according to Pausanias the
periegete,wasAgias,andhewasthegrandsonoftheEleanseerTisamenos(III,
11, 5f.). The diviner who acted for Lysandros at Aigospotamoi was thus the
directdescendantofthemanwhohadactedasmantisforregentPausaniasatthe
battleofPlataia.
At thispoint itmaybeforgivable toundertakeaspeculativereconstruction.
Surviving accounts of the engagement at Aigospotamoi tell of five successive
















Plataia. The latter announced that each of the sacrifices which he performed
resultedinomensrequiringthatSpartanforcesstayput,refrainfromattack;this
they reportedly did, in spite of extraordinary pressure, until at last the omens
turnedpositive(IX,36,61f.).Hisoppositenumber,theGreekseerinthePersian
camp,isrecordedasadvisinglikewise,andasbeingamplypaidforhiswork:IX,
37f. To bemaster of timing was, as we have seen, themantis’ particular role.
Xenophon would later record the enormous reward – ten talents – given by






Athenian relaxation.And there is some late evidencewhich tallies interestingly
withsuchahypothesis.ThewriterPausanias in the secondcenturyADvisited
SpartaandrecordedthatabronzestatueofthisAgiashadbeenerectedthere.He
states, ‘They say that this Agias, by his performance asmantis for Lysandros,
capturedtheAthenianfleetbyAigospotamoi…AgiaswasthesonofAgelochos
the sonofTisamenos, theEleanwho…etc.’ (III, 11, 5f.)Wenote the (tous)
extraordinary fact that Agias, rather than Lysandros, can be described as the
person who defeated the Athenians. This is even stronger than the phrasing
HerodotosusedofAgias’grandfather: the latter ‘byactingasmantiswas jointly








done, asXenophon indeed suggests, in adefensive spirit– toensure thatSparta’snaval crews
onlydisembarkedonceitwassafe,onceAthens’owncrewshaddoneso(Hell.II,1,24).
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was (through Agias) the recipient of particularly helpful signals from divinity.
Spartawouldsurelybewisetoreappointamanwithsuchprivilegedconnections.
HisopponentsinturnmightretrospectivelyhaveboostedtheroleofAgiasina
contrary spirit, to dilute Lysandros’ personal achievement. Indeed, diviners
associatedwithSpartanmilitarysuccessmayhaveservedgenerallyasdevaluersof
theachievementofgenerals,ofkings, inaccordancewith the spiritof levelling
among thehomoioi.Was thatperhapspartof the reason for the lasting acclaim







nal politics involving royalty and eventually Lysandros. Before the battle of
Mantineia(418),SpartanshadturnedonkingAgis(Thuc.,V,63).Hewasblamed
formilitarysetbacksandfornotprofitingfromwhattheysawasanunprecedent
edly good opportunity (παρασχ¤ν καλς ¢ς οªπω πρnτερον58) to crush Argos
(again).Itwasproposedtodemolishhishouse(ashadbeendoneinthecaseof
the exiled Leotykhidas; Hdt., VI, 72) and to fine him 100,000 drakhmai.
Thucydides indicates that the state cameclose toexecuting thesepunishments,
which in effect would have meant disgrace and permanent exile, but settled
insteadforseverelyrestrictingAgis’righttotakemilitaryinitiatives.Abodyof10
commissars was attached to him, to control decisions to lead out the Spartan
army; this should recall the body of officials which, according to Xenophon,
witnessedtheinspectionofomensoverwhichakingpresidedatsimilarstrategic
moments. A king from the other royal house, the Agiad Pausanias who suc
ceeded his father Pleistoanax, had profound differences of foreign policywith
Lysandros; thesearemostobvious inpolicy towardsAthens (Plut.,Lys.,21for















put to death at Sparta on a charge of possessing silver; Lysandros’ party is
recordedashavingpreviouslyarguedforcoinagetobeusedatSparta(Plut.,Lys.,
17).Howroyaltystoodonthatquestionisnotrecorded.Butwhen,inalateryear
(395), Lysandros was killed in warfare abroad, Pausanias – who had been
campaigningnearby–wasbroughttotrialagain,thistimenodoubtamidresent
mentathisnothavingpreventedLysandros’death.Hewasexiled,permanently.






A rival candidate for the thronewasAgesilaos, youngerhalfbrotherof the
late Agis. Xenophon, elsewhere the frank eulogist of Agesilaos, records in his
Hellenica that Agesilaos had the prominent backing of Lysandros. The latter’s
motive was very likely the hope that Agesilaos would prove helpful, if not
subservient, tohisown interest;Lysandroshadbeen,reportedly (Plut.,Ages.,2;
Lys.,22),theloverofAgesilaosinthelatter’syouth,andsuchrelationshipswere
supposed at Sparta to involvemoral dominance, the formationof the younger
male’scharacterbytheolder.Xenophon’saccountoftheconfrontationbetween
the two factions in this matter, so important for the standing of his revered
Agesilaos, is hardly trustworthy in what it asserts. Agesilaos or his supporters
would very likely pass toXenophon a version contrived to validate the future
king’s cause.61 But in another sense Xenophon’s account may be even more
revealing, because more general in its implication: it showed how Spartans
thoughttheyshouldresolvesuchmatters.
On thisoccasion too, secular argument is accompaniedbydivination.Each
sidearguedfromparentalattitudes toLeotykhidas’paternity,butalsofromthe
text of a supposed oracle. Xenophon and Plutarch, while diverging in other
respects, concur in this. Agesilaos in Xenophon’s account suggests that an
earthquake drove Leotykhidas’ true father into the open. Plutarch writes that,
accordingtoAgesilaos,theearthquakehaddrivenAgisfromhiswife’sbedfora
period, within which time Leotykhidas was conceived (Ages., 3 with Cartledge
1987,113).Xenophontellsofa‘veryeminentoraclespecialist,Diopeithes’who
spokeinsupportofLeotykhidasandadducedwhatheclaimedtobeanoracleof
Apollo, one which warned Sparta against a lame kingship. Plutarch helpfully
emphasises that Agesilaos was lame (Ages., 2); Xenophon tactfully leaves the

60 This episode is the subject of a masterly narrative and analysis in CARTLEDGE (1987),
p.11015.
61InXenophon’saccount,theyoungLeotykhidasgivesawayhiscasebyimplicitlyaccepting
the claim thatAgis refused to acknowledge him, and by arguing instead that theword of his
mothershouldbebelievedinthatshe‘knewmuchbetterthanhe[Agis]did’;Hell.III,3,2.
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matter implicit. Plutarch diverges fromXenophon also by supplying a text, in





Who was this Diopeithes, whose intervention was not only tolerated but
takensoseriouslyinanobviouslycapitalaffair?Wenotethatthelegitimacyofhis
‘Apolline’oracle isnotchallenged, even thoughnothing is said to indicate that
Spartans had a precise idea about its origin. In neither of our sources is a
patronymicorethnicgivenforDiopeithes.Xenophon,aswehaveseen,stresses
his eminence as oraclespecialist; Plutarch does likewise, perhaps with irony.
Scholarshaverightlysuggestedthatthepersoninquestionwasidenticalwiththe
Diopeithes mentioned in three different Athenian contexts by the comedian





been the foremostAthenianmantisofhisday,hisname twicegivenbyThucy
didesattheheadofalistofthoseswearingontheAtheniansidetoanagreement
with Sparta (V, 19, 2; 24, 1), ‘the great Diopeithes’ is either in his company
becausehetoowasverywellknown,or–bycomicinversion–becausehewas
ridiculously outclassed in importance by Lampon. The former explanation is
better;allthreecomicpassagesarehighlyallusive,thatis,lackingindetailabout
Diopeithes;theaudienceeachtimeisassumedtoknowwellwhoheis.Thelatest
of theAristophanicpassages, thatfromtheBirds, isof414.Wecannotbesure
thatDiopeithes was still alive in that year. But if hewas, 414would be close
enough to the timeofAgesilaos’ accession (400) to encourage speculation that
theDiopeithes involved in each casewasone and the same.There are several
possiblereasonsforAthenianDiopeithestohavecometoplyhiscraftatSparta.
Spartans at the period might have provided a more respectful audience, with
more grounds than the Athenians for heeding religious prophecy in political
affairs. Spartanmaterial support for divination could now draw on thewealth
diverted from theAthenian empire.AndLysandros,whose factionDiopeithes
soughttoobstruct,hadin4043beendrasticallymoreantiAthenianthanfellow
Spartanswhoopposedhim.Hehadnotonlypresidedoverthedestructionofthe
Athenian fleet and empire; he had also apparently sought the destruction of
Athensitself.InseekingtoblockLysandros’schemetoinstallAgesilaosasking,




that of Tisamenos: a foreigner, reputed for his specialism, allowed to regulate
Spartanroyaltytoadegree,becauseofthefaithwhichSpartansputinhiscraft.
In explainingwhyLysandros prevailed over the specialist soothsayer in the
interpretationoftheoracle,wemayadd,toconsiderationsofLysandros’secular
(albeitcontested)authority,afurtherreligiousmotive.AtthetimewhenThucy
dideswaswriting, Spartans – aswe have seen –were still telling of an earlier




a key to why an event was seen as ominous. A coincidence in time between
earthquakeandsuchsignicantadulterymightwellbe representedasnuminous.
AndaccordingtothewordingwehaveinXenophon,thatishowAgesilaosdid
represent it. The latter reportedly informed Leotykhidas, ‘But Poseidon gave
evidenceagainst your lyingaccountbydrivingyour fatheroutof thebedroom
and into the open with an earthquake’. Agesilaos then went on, according to
Xenophon, to say that ‘Youwere born in the tenthmonth from themoment
whenhetookflightandappearednomoreinthebedroom’(Hell.III,3,2).Now,
thisisaslightlyunexpectedwaytomakeapointwhich,tooursecularthinking,
would have beenmore simply and effectivelymade by saying, ‘And youwere




Agesilaos was implicitly claiming not only that relevant adultery had not
happened after the earthquake, but also that it had not happened before: that
Poseidon, in other words, had reacted with perfect timing, immediately the
offence took place. Once more it may seem that, for Spartans, appeal to a
publiclywitnessed event made for more persuasive divination than did an
oraculartextunsupportedbysuch.
TheconspiracyofKinadon–orofAgesilaos?
Within a year of Agesilaos’ contested succession, the Spartan authorities
announced thediscoveryofaconspiracyagainst theSpartiateclass and its rule
overthesouthernPeloponnese.Heretoo,asweshallshortlysee,divinationhas
an important role in the narrative. The conspirators were alleged to be (or to
include) men of inferior grades, led by one Kinadon who was apparently,
although a nonSpartiate, of standing to be entrusted with sensitive official
business. Aristotle mentions Kinadon briefly, as a person of manly qualities
excludedfromthehigheststatusanddriventherebytomountanattackagainst
the Spartiates. In the same sentence, he presents the case of Lysandros as an
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instanceofanarrowregimeprovokingsedition:‘whenindividualsofstatureand







we have concerning him. That narrative comes, however, primarily from
Xenophon(Hell.III,3,411).He(torepeat)wasthecontemporaryandeulogist









so far as it dealt with things publicly familiar, such as the approximate (and




far from publicly testable, in short what would have been to contemporary
Spartans ‘newsworthy’, we should be farmore sceptical. SuchwereKinadon’s
supposedguilt,hisconfession,theidentityofhisfew,intimateassociates,andof
his intended allies, the hosts of those belonging to various underclasses who
wouldsupposedlybeglad‘toeattheSpartiates,evenwithoutcookingthemfirst’
(Hell.III,3,6).TheSpartanshad,accordingtoThucydides’accountofanepisode
from the420s,put todeathvery largenumbers– some2000–ofhelotswho
were not only innocent but who had claims to be of exceptional loyalty and
helpfulnesstotheSpartiates.Thepurposeofthatslaughterhadbeentoheadoff
potentialrevoltofthehelotclassmoregenerally,andtheSpartans’procedureof




62 ContrastHow andWells (onHdt., IX, 37, ad loc.)who state, concerning the sufferings
Sparta might impose on the condemned seer Hegesistratos, ‘the Greeks did not use torture




few innocent – and impressive – men? We shall shortly consider details of








Significantly, for the purpose of the present study, the idea that divination
involvedineachplotwasexpectedbytheplotterstobecredibleisnotempha
sised or treated as a ‘newsworthy’ claim; instead, it is a given. Spartans were
expectedtotrusttheirdiviners.Andtheroleoftheseprophetsinthenarrativeof





this inspired report (a chronology by which Xenophon or his source surely
intendedtosignal thatthemantis’warningwaswellfounded), thefirst informer
broughttotheephorsdetailofaplotledbyKinadon.Xenophonthennarrates
howKinadonwassuccessfullydeceivedbytheauthorities,andinducedtoleave
Sparta so that he could be arrested discreetly. Detail is given on how the






about the outcome of the battle of Knidos. Here, in the case of Kinadon’s
conspiracy,Xenophonmaywellhave thoughthewasfollowingAgesilaos’own
version of events; he claims to know, as we have just seen, the words of the





initial, timely informer, thepièceà conviction,aspresentedbyXenophon, isKina
don’s own confession. That Kinadon should confess truthfully and name his
associates is presented byXenophon – implicitly – as natural, predictable and




on attacking the Spartiate class with weapons. It seems that Xenophon has
suppressed another predictable element of the affair: torture.63 Compare his
delicate silences elsewhere on matters embarrassing, or at least distasteful, to
Sparta: the fate of the thousands of Athenian sailors sentenced to death (and
killed)afterAigospotamoi,64thedetailsofSparta’sdefeatatLeuktra,65orindeed
the ultimate fate ofKinadon himself,whomXenophon describes as being led
aroundSpartawithhis fellowplotters,handsboundandneck in a ‘dogcollar’,
floggedandstabbedbutthereafterassimply‘receivingjustice’(τ«ςδ}κης τυχον,
III, 3, 11).And if torturewas involved,Kinadonmightof course say anything
that he thought the Spartiates wanted to hear. Or he might say nothing, his
‘confession’provided forhim. Spartiates themselvesmightdoubt the realityof
confessions in such a case. Was that, perhaps, why the official story was so
emphaticaboutthesoothsayer’sdirewarningatthestart:diditneeddivination
formostSpartanstobesurethattherehadbeenaplotatall?
Another soothsayerwas prominently involved in the story.Unlike the seer
whogavetheinitialwarning,thissecondprophetisnamed:Xenophonrefersto
him with the expression ‘themantis Tisamenos and the other most important
(πικαιριωττουs)’membersoftheplotwhowerearrested(III,3,11).Heisthus
prominentinthetale66–aswellhemightbe.ForthisTisamenosbearsthemost
distinguished name in the history of soothsaying at Sparta. He was almost
certainlyarelativeofthereveredTisamenoswhohadadvisedtheSpartansduring
andafterthePersianWars.WehaveseenthatAgias,recordedasthegrandsonof
the great Tisamenos, was remembered as the mantis who successfully guided
LysandrosatAigospotamoi,andwasenduringlyhonouredalongsidehisgeneral
onLysandros’monumentatDelphoi.ThetaleofKinadon’sconspiracyseemsto
presentanotherof themantic family, inall likelihoodaSpartiate,asconspiring
against the regime.Again,we cannotbe sure that this youngerTisamenoshad
anypartinanyplot.ButfortheSpartanauthoritiestohavebeenwillingatleastto
ruin the reputation of so eminentlyconnected a prophet, and probably to put
him to death with Kinadon and the others, should suggest a preexisting rift
withinrulingcircles.





65GROTE (vol.10,ch.78,p.165)describesXenophon’saccountof thebattleas ‘obscure,
partial,andimprintedwiththatchagrinwhichtheeventoccasionedtohim’.
66 David suggests that communication between fellowseers may have been the route by
whichAgesilaos’mantis came to know of a plot involving the seer Tisamenos (1979, p. 254).




Xenophon introduces the story ofKinadon’s plot immediately after ending
theaccountofAgesilaos’accession,anaccessionwhichhadbeencontestedon
divinatorygrounds.The linkwithAgesilaos isemphasised: ‘Agesilaoshadbeen
king for less than a year when, while he was sacrificing in the regular and
prescribedwayonbehalfofthecity(τντεταγxwνωντινθυσιν¬πρτ«ςπολwωs),
themantis stated that thegodswere indicating aplotof themost seriouskind’
(III,3,4).WeobserveXenophon’semphasisontheproper,officialnatureofthe
sacrifice. Such a sacrifice was very likely to be understood as having reliable,
officialwitnesses,asinthemilitarysacrificeswhichXenophonrecordselsewhere
inconnectionwithAgesilaos.WearenottothinkthatAgesilaoshadsuborneda





who feared or disapproved of Lysandros would be likely to resent the latter’s
choiceofking–untilsuchtimeasAgesilaosdistancedhimselfdefinitivelyfrom
hiseminentpatron.AndsincetheaccessionofAgesilaoshadinvolvedignoring









of his chief aims. Plutarch records that later, after the catastrophic defeat at
Leuktrain371,SpartanscensuredAgesilaosforhis improperaccessionandthe
disregardoftheoracleaboutlameness,andblamedhimforthegeneralcollapse
ofSpartanpower (Ages., 30, cf. 34;Comp.Ages. andPomp., 1).Here, it seems, is




















Afinal episode for thepresent study involveselaboratepropheticmachina
tions ascribed to Lysandros. His purpose was supposedly to consolidate his




its chief presuppositions: that in deciding matters of their own high politics,
Spartans depended profoundly on divination from nonSpartan sources.
Surviving narrative of Lysandros’ supposed plot is found chiefly in Diodorus
(XIV,13)andPlutarch(Lys.,246).69SinceDiodorusnormallyfollowsEphoros
for this period, and Plutarch (ibid., 25, 30) twice names Ephoros as his own
sourceinthisconnection,itisvirtuallycertainthatthenarrativegoesbacktothe
FourthCentury.Aristotlealsoreferstothematter,albeitbrieflyandguardedly:‘as
some say that Lysandros tried to abolish the kingship’ (Pol., 1301b, cf. 1306b).
Plutarch (Lys., 30) represents elements of Lysandros’ plot as having been
discoveredbyAgesilaoswhilesearchingLysandros’houseafterthelatter’sdeath
in395.There couldhardlybe a clearerwarning than this for themodern–or
ancient – sourcecritic. Agesilaos had clashed repeatedly with his former lover
andpromoter;thetwomenhadaclearconflictofinterestsoverwhoshouldhave
themain influence overGreek allies of Sparta inAsiaMinor and elsewhere.70
Agesilaos might well wish to reduce the influence of Lysandros’ domestic














viewed by other Greeks. Sparta’s lively concern to determine what potential








at the time by any sort of formal process to which defenders of Lysandros’
memorymighthavehadaccess.Informalanddelayeddiffusionofthestorymay
ofcoursehaveaidedthecauseofdefamation.ThemotivegivenbyPlutarchfor




own invention.71 At Sparta, a state resembling modern governments in its






forbrevity, be selectiveofdetail, though thatof coursehas its risks.Agesilaos
claimed to have found, while searching Lysandros’ house for other reasons, a
speechwritten forhimbyoneKleonofHalikarnassos (otherwiseunknown to
us)advocatingtheprincipleofreplacingSparta’sdyarchswitharulerchosenon
merit (Lys., 26, 30).Plutarch reports thatLysandroshad learned the speechby
heart,inthehopeofconvincingSpartansthereby.Oneasksimmediatelyhowthe
discoveryofawrittenspeechcouldhavebeenaccompaniedbyproperinforma








reward it handsomely.72 Far more likely to impress Spartans was appeal to





Delphic divination; and it is thiswhich forms themain element of the alleged
plot.
Lysandros, it is said,hadhopedtoprocurefromcorruptDelphicofficialsa
prophecystatingthat‘ItwouldbebetterandmoreadvantageousfortheSpartans
tochoosetheirkingsfromamongthebestcitizens’.Toexplainwhythisoracle
had previously been unknown, it was to be claimed that Delphoi had long
possessed a secret store of oracles, which could be revealed only by a son of
Apollo. A young man, the son of the poor woman from Pontus, was to be
presentedasthatperson;he,withsuitablestagingandhelpfromthecomplaisant
Delphians,would dramatically reveal the oraclewhich so obviously pointed to
Lysandros.The youngmandidduly come toDelphoi, but another of the key
conspirators took fright and disappeared. Plutarch, ironically sustaining his
theatrical imagery, writes that Lysandros ‘failed to carry out his dramatic
production(δρxατοs), throughlackofdaringonthepartofoneoftheactors
(¬ποκριτν)’ (Lys., 26). He adds: ‘None of this emerged during Lysandros’
lifetime, but only after his death’. Plutarch allows his own disapproval of
Lysandros to show at times, aswhen describing the ‘uncountable slaughter of
democrats’carriedoutbyandfortheSpartan leader(Lys.,19),orhisdeceptive





As one who himself became a priest of Delphoi, Plutarch’s distaste at the
planned corruption – that is, devaluation – of the shrine can be imagined.
Significantly, he does not doubt the general story; it evidently fitted well with
otherrecordedaspectsofLysandros’career.





concerned his relations with the three leading shrines of the Greek world.
Lysandros is recorded as having excused an absence from Sparta by claiming




against the hereditary dyarchy, we should of course ask whether this story
concerningAmmonwas concocted by the same source. It is possible; but the
eventsconcerningAmmon–thedeparturethitherofLysandrosandthearrivalat




was Lysandros’ intense interest in Delphoi, which he had adorned by the
conspicuous andhugely expensivememorial tohis victoryover theAthenians.
Plutarch (Lys., 18) would later pass on a report from one Anaxandridas of
Delphoi that Lysandros had left a personal deposit of slightly less than two
talentsattheshrine;ifanythingofthishadbeenknownatthetime,itwouldalso
have added colour to stories of his having intended to bribe the Delphic
authorities.Astothereport,evidentlyfromEphoros(Plut.,Lys.,25,cf.Diod.Sic.,
XIV,13), thatLysandroshadalsoattempted tosubornofficialsat theoracular





oracular means were required to undermine it’ (1987, 95). We have seen, in
connectionwith the restorationof kingPleistoanax, that the ideaof the kings’
havingbeen installed,with religiousacts, at thevery foundationof theSpartan




kings are apparently presented in the ‘Great’ Rhetra as ρχαγwταs, ‘founder
leaders’(Plut.,ibid.),whichprosetextcouldbepresentedbyPlutarchasderived
fromDelphoibyLykourgos(that is, longafter thefoundationofSparta).73We
haveseenevidenceofrepeated,sometimesviolentrejectionofindividualSpartan
kingsthroughthefifthcentury;andintheearlyfourthcametheexilingofking
Pausanias.Given the strength of resistance to particular kings, onemightwell
imagine that the whole principle of hereditary kingship needed some very
powerfuldefence inorder towithstandpressure for its abolition.Thatdefence
verylikelywasreligiousbelief,andfaithintheextremeantiquityoftheinstitution.
This latter faithmight itselfhavea religiouselement: the idea that thekingship
couldnot havehad the eudaimonia or eutykhia to last so longwithout sustained
divine support. If Lysandros’ plot was genuine, or if indeed it was faked by
Agesilaos,itevidentlyreflectedagraveproblemforopponentsoftheprincipleof
hereditary dyarchy. IfDelphoi alone could undowhatDelphoi itself had once
sanctioned, the traditional close relationship of the kingswithDelphoi, and in
particular their guardianship of Delphic oracles concerning Sparta, gave the
dyarchs a block.Even ifDelphoiwere to turn against the dyarchs it had long






shrine might itself be subject to incredulity – unless specially impressive





thesourcecritic,sounappealingto therationalisthistorian, turnsout tohavea
solid virtue: it proves that, in the fourth century, the idea of abolishing the
hereditarydyarchywas in theair–certainlyoutsideSpartaandalmostcertainly
within it. The apparently nebulous tale from Antiquity calls attention to two
modern errors of perspective, both structural.As historians,we have overesti
mated the solidity of the dyarchy, and thus of Sparta’s constitution more
generally,fortworeasons.Thefirstreasonisthatwehavefollowedtooclosely
thegazeofourprincipalsources.Herodotoswritesunforgettablyoftheonlyking
who came to a spectacularly good end: Leonidas. Thucydides dilates on king
Arkhidamos, and Xenophon wrote at length explicitly, and perhaps at even
greater length implicitly, aboutAgesilaos.Leonidas casts apositive auraon the
kingship,whilethelattertwokingspresentforusanimageofsolidity.Arkhida
moswaskingforoverfortyyears,andalongwarisnamedafterhim;Agesilaos
reigned for almost exactly forty years, and he is rightly taken as symbolizing
Sparta’scritical,long,periodofdecline.Ifweconsideredasoftenthefulllistof







– Pleistoanax (458408, with interruption): exiled for almost half of his
reign,livinginsanctuaryforfearofSpartanviolence.Pressedbyserious
accusationsafterhisrestoration.

















It appears that, over the period 500395, most (seven out of eleven) royal
rulersofSpartawereeitherkilled,enduringlyexiledorthreatenedwithexile.
Now,thelatertheviewpointofaSpartanwithinthatperiod,themorelikelyit
would have seemed to him – from ordinary induction – that current dyarchs
wouldalsocometoabadend.
Butherewereachthesecondmodernerrorofperspective.Weourselvesare
likely to be seduced by a mentality which besets historians of every level:
hindsight. Just as (for example) every historian knows that a great syllabus is
openingwithAgrippa’svictoryatActium,andislikelytothink(unlessheorshe
struggles against the idea, consistently) that Romans of the time held a corre
spondingviewaboutthePrincipatethenbeginning,75sowearesurelytemptedto
assumethatAgesilaosonhisaccessionfelthehadalongfutureasking.Werisk
missing,or exploring too little, the insecurityhemight feel ashe accededafter
unusualcontesttoapostwhichwouldpredictablycomeunderfierceattack.By




contemporary Spartan opinion – save for religious considerations. But those
religious considerations were themselves far from insignificant, whence their
prominenceinthesources.
Itseems,then,thatwithintheperiodofSpartanhistoryforwhichourinfor
mation is most extensive, from the reign of Kleomenes to that of Agesilaos,
religionformedacommandingelement inSpartandecisionmaking,onmatters
whichcontemporariesknewtobeofthehighestimportance.Byattendingtothis
use of divinationwe also come to perceive the enduring insecurity of Sparta’s
mostprominentauthorities,thekings.Thisfragilityinthekingshipmayseemto
be at odds with a feature of Sparta’s society prominently and well studied in
recent times: her extraordinary royal funerals. Famously, Herodotos ‘makes









(Hell. III,3,1), and thatdeceasedkingswere regardedasheroes rather thanas
deadmortals(Lak.Pol.,15,9).Thefunctionsofafuneralarevariedandsubtle.
Cartledge brings out this complexity with exactitude and caution. Parker also
writesattractively,‘Nothingbringsouttherealitiesofhierarchyandpoweraswell
as a funeral.76 But the forms of a royalist ceremony, gaudy or sombre, may
seduce. Is it perhaps the case that one element in these assertive funerals
amounted in effect to ‘Argumentweak: shout!’? Spartans, those experts in the
applicationoftiming,wouldknowthatafuneral,inmanyculturesatimeforthe
mentalityofDemortuisnilnisibonum,wastherightmomenttoventureanextreme






those which had accompanied the original installation of Sparta’s kingship,
centuries before, at the very founding of the polis. This toowas Pleistoanax’s
momentofstrength,inacareercharacterisedbyweakness:restored,forreligious
reasons, after some two decades in humiliating and dangerous exile, he faced
domesticenemieswhowouldbepowerfulenoughinfuturetoimpose,indirectly,
thedirectionofhisforeignpolicy.Heusedhismoment,asothersperhapsused
the royal funerals, to assert – defensively – the antiquity of his office and its




As to the importance of prophecy in general among Spartans, does there
remain any reason why the convergent testimony of Herodotos, Thucydides,
Xenophon and later Greek writers should be accorded unusually little critical
attention,or respect? In the lightofSparta’s talent forofficial lying andmyth








IX, 7). But such an idea would require the further assumption that Spartan
authorities,whilepossiblycynicalthemselves,supposedotherGreeks,atleast,to
believe that religiously correctbehaviourdid lead todivine support.Moreover,
much of our information on Spartan trust in divination concerns scandal and
divisionwithinSparta,mattershardlycontrivedtoimposeonoutsidersanideaof
Spartan superiority. Internal Spartan arguments aboutwhether Pleistoanax had
corrupted the Delphic oracle, and thereby brought on Sparta repeated divine
punishment, are likely to have had a very different effect if circulated abroad.




adverse, and reassemblea force fora secondexpeditionagainstArgos later in
the year?’ (1989,158, citingThuc.,V,54f.)Themodern scepticmightperhaps
haverecoursetotheideathat,whileSpartansingeneralwereprivatelydisbeliev
ersofdivination,asindividualstheytendedtojudgethattheyhadbetterappear
not tobe, for fearofoffendingamajorityopinionatSpartawhich they incor
rectlybelievedtobemorepious–andthathistoriansfromothercitiesthuscame
toshareinthemirageofSpartanreligiosity.Suchanideacouldnotbedisproved,
but amore economical hypothesis is available: that, in imputing to their own
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